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CASE NOTE

RETROACTIVITY, STRICKLAND, AND ALIEN CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS: HOW THE CHAIDEZ DECISION
RAISED MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERED

D ANIELLE R. A CKER SUSANJ†
INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court decides to hear a case, it does
not grant certiorari simply on the case itself—it chooses to answer a “question presented” by that case. So in Chaidez v. United States, 1 the Court
granted certiorari on the question “whether the principle articulated in
Padilla [v. Kentucky] applies to persons whose convictions became ﬁnal
before its announcement.” 2 But in answering that question, Chaidez left
unanswered—and raised—even more questions.
In the 2010 landmark case Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court declared that
defense lawyers must inform noncitizen criminal defendants of the removal
consequences of pleading guilty.3 In the years that followed, federal and
state courts grappled with—and ultimately split over—whether Padilla
applied only to defendants whose cases were still on direct appeal, or also to
those whose convictions were ﬁnal before Padilla. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Chaidez, and, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan,
upheld the Seventh Circuit’s ruling4 that Padilla established a “new rule”
not available retroactively.5
† Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 161. J.D., University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wheaton College.
1 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).
2 Brief for Petitioner at i, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820), 2012 WL 2948891.
3 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
4 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103.
5 133 S. Ct. at 1107-11.
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But the Court’s ruling did not address several of the diﬃcult questions
that come up in retroactivity analysis, particularly for any rule premised on
Strickland v. Washington.6 It also left many questions open for alien petitioners
who seek relief from their convictions. Part I of this Note discusses how the
Court has traditionally handled the retroactive application of rules to habeas
petitioners and how the issue arose after Padilla. It summarizes the Teague7
rule for retroactivity and the problem the Padilla decision posed for lower
courts determining its retroactive application. Part II discusses the Chaidez
decision and notes the various policy and practical concerns implicated (and
ignored) in its retroactivity analysis. Part III notes the open questions that
persist after Chaidez—particularly for petitioners whose lawyers aﬃrmatively
gave them wrong information at the time they pleaded guilty—and examines where the Court may be heading with its recent plea jurisprudence.
Finally, Part III also questions how long Teague and Strickland can function
together, as new norms in criminal procedure evolve, become prevailing,
and ultimately gain recognition from courts.
I. BACKGROUND: R ETROACTIVE R ULES AND THE G REAT W RIT
When the Supreme Court requires a procedural protection for criminal
defendants, often it must determine which criminal defendants should get
the beneﬁt of that rule. Its current approach is to limit claims under “new”
rules to defendants whose convictions are on direct review, while allowing
all petitioners, even those whose convictions are ﬁnal, to seek the protection
of rules that are not new.
A. The Development of Postconviction Review
The question of when a Supreme Court decision on criminal procedure
should apply retroactively to cases on collateral review became more complicated as the Warren Court began issuing sweeping rulings, such as Miranda v.
Arizona 8 and Mapp v. Ohio, 9 that revolutionized criminal procedure. The
potentially huge number of petitioners who could have taken advantage of
those new rules led the Court to determine that retroactivity would not be
automatic, but would depend on the purpose of the new rule, the extent of
6
7
8

466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a Sixth Amendment right to eﬀective assistance of counsel).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
See 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring certain preinterrogation warnings for individuals taken
into custody).
9 See 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule against the
states).
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reliance on the old rule, and the eﬀect of retroactive application on the
administration of justice.10 Justice Harlan criticized the Court’s retroactivity
approach in his dissents from the line of cases that followed, arguing that all
decisions should apply retroactively to cases on direct review, but that
“new” rules should not apply to cases on collateral review.11 Decades later,
in Griﬃth v. Kentucky 12 and Teague v. Lane, 13 the Court adopted Justice
Harlan’s views about retroactivity.
B. The Teague Rule
New constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively
to cases on collateral review. 14 So in a case like Chaidez, the threshold
question is whether the rule the petitioner seeks to take advantage of is
“new.” If it is, the rule applies retroactively only if it falls under one of two
exceptions: (1) it places new constitutionally protected conduct beyond the
government’s authority to regulate, or (2) it implicates fundamental fairness
and bears on guilt or innocence.15 While the Supreme Court has handled
the question of retroactivity multiple times and has provided some guidance, the contours of what constitutes a new rule remain fuzzy. Some have

10 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1241 (6th ed. 2009) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967)).
11 See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Griﬃth v. Kentucky, ��� U.S. ��� (1987); see also F ALLON, JR. ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 1241-42 (presenting Justice Harlan’s position).
12 479 U.S. at 321-23.
13 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). Although Teague was a plurality decision,
subsequent majorities of the Court have accepted its approach. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 313 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also
F ALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 10, at 1242. Teague controls retroactivity analysis for many types
of postconviction review of both federal and state convictions. However, the Antiterrorism and
Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of ���� (AEDPA) limits retroactivity for habeas petitions ﬁled under
the Act that seek federal review of a state conviction, if a state court has already ruled on the
merits of the claim being raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
14 The Court has held that Teague applies only to rules of criminal procedure, not to substantive rules of criminal law. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
15 Teague, 489 U.S. at 290; F ALLON , J R . ET AL ., supra note 10, at 1245-46. The ﬁrst exception relates to new rules governing “primary conduct,” which apply retroactively because they
place certain actions outside of the government’s power, or protect certain conduct from
government interference or regulation. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004)
(citations omitted). Under the second exception, rules will be retroactive only if they are
“watershed” rules of criminal procedure, “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313. While the Court has never found such a rule, it
has suggested repeatedly that the rule articulated in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
would have fallen under this exception. See, e.g., Saﬄe v. Parks, ��� U.S. ���, 495 (1990).
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argued, however, that “it is clear that the Court generally deﬁnes a new rule
expansively and instances where rules have retroactive application narrowly.”16
A rule that “‘breaks new ground,’ ‘imposes a new obligation on the
States or the Federal Government,’ or was not ‘dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became ﬁnal’” may be new,
the Court has said.17 When ﬁnding that a case announces a new rule, the
Court has often discussed whether reasonable jurists disagreed on the issue
prior to the Court’s decision. 18 Teague’s “‘new rule’ principle therefore
validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made
by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.”19
If lower courts have been split, that conﬂict militates toward a rule being new.20
The easiest way to identify a new rule is if it overrules prior precedent.21
On the other hand, a rule is not new if it was dictated by precedent that
controlled or required the outcome. The question “is more diﬃcult . . .
when a decision extends the reasoning” of previous cases.22 Justice Kennedy
pondered this question in his concurrence in Wright v. West, in which the
Court considered a criminal procedure rule that required a case-by-case
evaluation of what is rational: “Where the beginning point is . . . a rule
designed for the speciﬁc purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts,
it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new
rule, one not dictated by precedent.”23

16
17

E RWIN C HEMERINSKY, F EDERAL JURISDICTION 939 (5th ed. 2007).
Saﬄe, 494 U.S. at 488 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301); see also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521
U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (considering these factors).
18 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 (2004) (stating that the diﬀering of reasonable
jurists points to a new rule); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 395 (1994) (same); Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467-68 (1993) (same).
19 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
20 See, e.g., Caspari, 510 U.S. at ��� (relying largely on lower court division in ﬁnding a new
rule). But see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-10 (2000) (stating, in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ ����(d)(�), that conﬂict among courts alone is not suﬃcient to show a new rule).
21 See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, ��� U.S. ���, ��� (����) (ﬁnding Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004), to establish a new rule because it overruled prior governing precedent).
22 Saﬄe, 494 U.S. at 488. See generally Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233-41 (1990) (discussing at length whether the rule announced by Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), was
dictated by prior cases).
23 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The Wright Court
considered the application of the standard for suﬃciency of evidence established in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)—“whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Wright, 505 U.S. at 308.
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C. Padilla v. Kentucky
On the advice of his lawyer, Jose Padilla pleaded guilty to a drug
traﬃcking oﬀense, which made him eligible for removal.24 Padilla ﬁled for
postconviction relief, arguing that his lawyer had told him that he “did not
have to worry about” being deported, which deprived him of the eﬀective
assistance of counsel in his decision to plead guilty.25 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky ruled without an evidentiary hearing that Padilla had not stated a
claim for denial of eﬀective assistance of counsel because he was not entitled
to eﬀective assistance regarding collateral consequences. 26 The Supreme
Court of Kentucky was the ﬁrst court to hold that misadvice could not
constitute ineﬀective assistance,27 but most federal and state courts before
Padilla had held that defense attorneys were not required to give aﬃrmative
advice on the collateral consequences of guilty pleas, including removal.28
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, with ﬁve Justices joining the
holding that “constitutionally competent counsel would have advised” that a
conviction would make the defendant subject to removal, if that consequence were clear.29 The Court placed this requirement under the Strickland
line of cases; it ruled that a defense attorney’s failure to advise that a
conviction would make a defendant automatically deportable violated the
Sixth Amendment right to eﬀective assistance of counsel.30 Under Strickland, the Court asked whether the defense attorney’s conduct “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” 31 The Court measures this by the
“practice and expectations of the legal community,” 32 examined “under
prevailing professional norms.”33 Those norms, the Padilla Court concluded,
recognized that providing advice on deportation consequences was a duty of
the criminal defense attorney. 34 The Court noted that it had previously
recognized in INS v. St. Cyr that removal consequences are relevant to the

24
25
26
27
28

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 & n.1 (2010).
Id. at 1478 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484-85 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473.
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1493-94 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1487 (citations omitted); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Eﬀective
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 C ORNELL L. R EV. 697, 699 (2002)
(reviewing lower court decisions).
29 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1483 (majority opinion).
30 See id. at 1482, 1486-87. Strickland’s standard for ineﬀective assistance of counsel was ﬁrst
applied to guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985).
31 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
32 Id.
33 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
34 Id. at 1482-83.
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decision whether to plead guilty.35 According to the Court, “For at least the
past 15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on
counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s
plea.” 36 Further, the Court observed that it had never held relevant the
distinction between direct criminal consequences and collateral consequences
of conviction in the context of ineﬀective assistance of counsel.37
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, suggested that the Court’s opinion was too broad. Justice
Alito would have held that constitutionally eﬀective counsel (1) must refrain
from “unreasonably providing incorrect advice,” and (2) should inform
defendants that pleading guilty “may have adverse immigration consequences” and advise them to contact an immigration attorney for more
information.38 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing
that the Sixth Amendment only “guarantees the accused a lawyer ‘for his
defense’ against a ‘criminal prosecutio[n],’” and that therefore the majority
was “swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.”39
The Padilla opinion did not address whether it would apply retroactively.
So in the following years, lower courts split over whether Padilla applied to
petitioners whose convictions were already ﬁnal.40
II. T HE CHAIDEZ D ECISION
A. Background of the Case
Roselva Chaidez entered the United States from Mexico, and in 1977
became a legal permanent resident.41 In 2003, she was charged with three
counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance fraud scheme and,
later that year, on the advice of her attorney, pleaded guilty to two of the
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 1483 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)).
Id. at 1485.
Id. at 1481.
Id. at 1487, 1494 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
Compare United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that Padilla
applies retroactively), and Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 899-901, 907 (Mass. 2011)
(same), with United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that Padilla does
not apply retroactively), United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011) (same),
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (same), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013),
and State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089, 1107 (N.J. 2012) (same). The Fourth Circuit similarly noted that
“nothing in the Padilla decision indicates that it is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review.” United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 404 F. App’x 714, 715 n.* (4th Cir. 2010).
41 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686.
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counts and received a sentence of four years of probation.42 Because the
federal fraud charges to which Chaidez pleaded guilty involved more than
$10,000, she became eligible for removal as an aggravated felon, and removal
proceedings began in 2009.43 Chaidez then sought to have her conviction
overturned, claiming ineﬀective assistance of counsel because her attorney
failed to tell her that pleading guilty to mail fraud could lead to her removal.44
While Chaidez’s petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Padilla. The district court hearing Chaidez’s petition determined that Padilla
was not a new rule,45 granted her petition, and vacated her conviction.46 The
government appealed, claiming that Padilla was a new rule that should not
have been applied retroactively, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
for the government.47
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,48 perhaps inﬂuenced by the Solicitor General’s (SG) brief supporting review.49 The SG’s brief argued that
the Seventh Circuit’s decision was correct but that this “recurring” issue “of
substantial importance” had resulted in a direct conﬂict among the courts of
appeals. 50 The SG’s sole commentary on the case’s appropriateness as a
vehicle was an assertion that it would be “suitable,” citing to Chaidez’s own
petition for certiorari.51 While the SG argued that the two Teague exceptions
to nonretroactivity for new rules did not apply in Chaidez,52 it did not note
that Chaidez had, in fact, waived the argument that the Padilla rule could ﬁt

42
43

Id.
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Any alien who is
convicted of [fraud in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000] is deportable.”).
44 Chaidez, ��� F.�d at ���. Because Chaidez was not in custody when she ﬁled her petition,
she ﬁled a writ of coram nobis, which allows a petitioner who is no longer “in custody”—and so
ineligible for habeas relief—to collaterally attack her conviction. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106 n.1;
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686.
45 United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010), rev’d, 655 F.3d 684,
aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103.
46 United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6,
2010), rev’d, 655 F.3d 684, aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103.
47 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686, 694.
48 Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
49 Cf. RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 23 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari
petitions from the SG, or from those the SG supports, than from any other party).
50 Brief for the United States at 8, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820), 2012 WL 1097108.
51 See id. at 21 (“This case is a suitable vehicle for the Court to resolve the question of Padilla’s retroactivity. The question is squarely presented and determinative of petitioner’s right to
relief.” (citations omitted)).
52 Id. at 11.
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the exceptions53—meaning that if the Court found Padilla to be a new rule
and therefore nonretroactive, it would be less appropriate for the Court to go
on and analyze the exceptions, as it typically has in Teague cases.
B. The Decision
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court held that, under a Teague analysis,
“Padilla does not have retroactive eﬀect.”54 According to Teague, the Court
observed, a rule is not new when it applies a general standard to “the kind
of factual circumstances it was meant to address”; “garden-variety applications” of Strickland are not new.55 But the majority characterized Padilla as
having answered a threshold question before analyzing the Strickland issue
of ineﬀective assistance: ﬁrst, the Padilla Court had to determine if “advice
about deportation” was “‘categorically removed’ from the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.”56 Because the Padilla Court, before determining how Strickland applied, ﬁrst had to decide whether Strickland applied,
its answer “required a new rule.”57
The opinion also places great weight on another Teague factor—whether
reasonable jurists disagreed about the classiﬁcation of the rule. At multiple
points, the opinion notes that a rule is new unless it would have been
“apparent to all reasonable jurists,” phrasing taken from the Court’s decision in Lambrix v. Singletary, an earlier Teague case.58 The Court noted that
following Hill v. Lockhart,59 in which the Court left open “whether advice
concerning a collateral consequence must satisfy Sixth Amendment
requirements,” lower courts had concluded “almost unanimously” that it did
not. 60 Because Padilla’s holding “that the failure to advise about a noncriminal consequence could violate the Sixth Amendment” was not “apparent

53 See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2011), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (“The
parties agree that . . . neither exception to non-retroactivity applies.”).
54 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105. Noting that he “continue[s] to believe that Padilla was wrongly
decided,” Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 1113-14 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented. Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 1107 (majority opinion); see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
56 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108 (citation omitted).
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., id. at 1107, 1111 (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997)).
59 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
60 See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108-09 (noting that ten federal appellate courts and almost thirty
state courts had so held, while only two state courts thought that failure to advise as to deportation
or other collateral consequences could violate the Sixth Amendment).
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to all reasonable jurists,” it was a new rule, the Court said.61 The Court
acknowledged that there was not the same consensus before Padilla against
claims premised on a lawyer’s misadvice. But it set to the side the category
of misadvice 62 before again concluding that Chaidez had not established
“that all reasonable judges, prior to Padilla, thought they were living in a
Padilla-like world.”63
Interestingly, the footnotes in the decision read like the seeds of the
vehicle section of a good brief in opposition to certiorari—a brief that was
not written, of course, because the SG acquiesced in the grant of certiorari.
The Court had to note that (1) it was assuming, without deciding, that the
fact that Chaidez petitioned for a writ of coram nobis rather than habeas
corpus was irrelevant; 64 (2) Chaidez had not argued that either Teague
exception applied; 65 (3) it was not evaluating whether Teague, with its
emphasis on federalism and comity, is inapplicable to federal convictions;66
(4) it was not deciding whether Padilla claims must remain available on
collateral review because they cannot be brought earlier;67 and (5) misadvice
was not present in Chaidez’s claim.68
C. The Dissent
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that
Padilla “did nothing more than apply the existing rule of Strickland . . . in a
new setting, the same way the Court has done repeatedly in the past.” 69
Padilla, she said, was a “straightforward” application of Strickland, “rooted in
15 years of professional standards and the Court’s prior St. Cyr decision,”
and so was not a new rule.70 In fact, she observed that the Court had “never
found that an application of Strickland resulted in a new rule” before

61
62

Id. at 1111 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 1112 (noting that the rule in some circuits “that a lawyer may not aﬃrmatively
misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client on any important matter” had
“co-existed happily with precedent” holding that a defendant need not be advised of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1106 n.1. For an explanation of the writ, see supra note 44.
65 Id. at 1107 n.3.
66 Id. at 1113 n.16. Chaidez failed to adequately raise this argument below or at the certiorari
stage. Id.
67 Id. Chaidez also failed to raise this argument before the merits stage. Id.
68 Id. at 1112.
69 Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1120.
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Chaidez. 71 Justice Sotomayor argued that the Padilla rule should be no
diﬀerent, for when the Court “merely” applies Strickland “in a way that
corresponds to an evolution in professional norms,” it makes “no new law.”72
She also took the majority to task for “fail[ing] to account for the development of professional standards over time” when surveying the law of the
lower courts before Padilla.73 In more recent years, she noted, lower courts
had made an exception to earlier case law by allowing Strickland claims to go
forward where lawyers had made “aﬃrmative misstatements about the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.”74 These decisions, she argued,
had already breached the divide between direct and collateral consequences.75
D. Evaluating the Decision
While the Chaidez decision answered (in the negative) the question
whether Chaidez could successfully raise a Padilla claim, it left open more
issues than it clariﬁed and failed to comment on many considerations the
Court has traditionally found to be important in Teague cases.
1. “Reasonable Jurists”
Justice Kagan followed the lead of many of the Court’s previous decisions by relying heavily on the fact that the Padilla rule was not “apparent
to all reasonable jurists.” As the dissent noted, “What truly appears to drive
the majority’s analysis is its sense that Padilla occasioned a serious disruption in lower court decisional reasoning.”76 Generally, if the Court discusses
“reasonable jurists” in a Teague case, the habeas petitioner is doomed.77 The
“reasonable jurists” language is found nowhere in Teague, but rather seems
to have developed later; most cases cite to Lambrix v. Singletary 78 when
discussing this factor.79 The Lambrix Court, in turn, relied on language from
Butler v. McKellar that asked whether the rule was “susceptible to debate

71 Id. at 1114-��, ���� n.� (citing Laﬂer v. Cooper, ��� S. Ct. ���� (����); Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)).
72 Id. at 1115.
73 Id. at 1118.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1119.
76 Id. at 1120.
77 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
78 520 U.S. 518 (1997).
79 See, e.g., Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 (majority opinion).
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among reasonable minds,”80 similar to the formulation in Sawyer v. Smith of
whether “reasonable jurists may disagree.”81
But while the Court consistently discusses this factor when ﬁnding a
rule to be new, it tends to ignore or downplay it when ﬁnding a rule to be
retroactive. In Williams v. Taylor, Justice Stevens stated that Teague’s
emphasis on respecting “‘reasonable, good-faith interpretations’ by state
courts is an explanation of policy, not a statement of law.”82 The Court
went on to explain,
“[E]ven though [this Court has] characterized the new rule inquiry as
whether ‘reasonable jurists’ could disagree as to whether a result is dictated
by precedent, the standard for determining when a case establishes a new
rule is ‘objective,’ and the mere existence of conﬂicting authority does not
necessarily mean a rule is new.”83

And in Stringer v. Black, the Court made no mention of “reasonable jurists” when it asserted that the court of appeals below had acted unreasonably—according to an “objective standard”—by not applying Supreme Court
precedent. 84 It was left to the three dissenters to note that the Court’s
holding implied that “no reasonable jurist” could have believed that certain
precedent cases did not apply to the petitioner, even though the dissent
itself did not think the Court’s holding was so “obvious.”85
This reliance on the existence of disagreement among reasonable jurists
begins to seem like a bit of post hoc rationalization when it surfaces only in
cases where the rule is found to be new. It is worth asking, then, how
helpful the formulation really is. For a Court with a docket made up in
large part of circuit splits,86 where, by deﬁnition, presumably reasonable
jurists explicitly disagree, it will be the unusual case in which the Court
issues a rule that was already universally predicted, or at least not contravened, by lower courts. Any time the Court took up a case presenting a
80
81
82

494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990); see also Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528.
497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990).
529 U.S. 362, 383 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.). Although the Williams Court discussed
Teague, Williams was in fact an AEDPA case. See id. at 375.
83 Id. at 410 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted in original) (quoting Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
84 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992) (noting that the court below was bound by Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 (1980)).
85 Id. at 238 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86 See John S. Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and Understanding
of U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S. L. W K. 393, 393 (Sept. 27, 2011)
(ﬁnding that from October Term 2005 through October Term 2010, 37.8% of the Court’s merits
cases presented circuit splits).
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circuit split, either to reverse a lower court or even to write an opinion that
was not unanimous, this factor would require that the Court’s rule be
labeled “new.”87 But allowing the “reasonable jurists” factor to dictate the
outcome would override the various considerations that led to the Teague
doctrine.88 In fact, Justice O’Connor, the author of Teague, once observed
that the “‘all reasonable jurists’ standard would tend to mislead federal
habeas courts by focusing their attention on a subjective inquiry rather than
on an objective one.” 89 Indeed, even Justice Kagan noted in Chaidez,
“Dissents have been known to exaggerate the novelty of majority opinions;
and ‘the mere existence of a dissent,’ like the existence of conﬂicting
authority in state or lower federal courts, does not establish that a rule is
new.” 90 This acknowledgment seems to undermine the majority’s heavy
reliance on the “reasonable jurists” factor.
It may be time to abandon the “reasonable jurists” factor as an indicator
of a new rule under Teague. Although the “reasonable jurists” factor reﬂects
Teague’s concern with respecting lower courts, it does not appear to be
helping the Court reach its decisions. The Court has seemingly abandoned
the factor when it decides that a rule is not new—likely because in a case
where a rule is made retroactive, a majority’s discussion of the factor would
only highlight the implication that any lower courts—and dissenting
Justices—who opposed that rule were “unreasonable.”91 And if the Court
only discusses the factor in decisions that conclude that a rule is new, it
seems that the factor contributes little to the Court’s analysis; rather, it
merely supports an already-reached decision that a rule is new.
2. Leaving Open the Issue of Misadvice
The scope of the majority opinion and the apparent understanding of
the dissent seem to leave open the possibility that the Chaidez decision
applies only to the failure to give advice, while claims of misadvice may
remain available to habeas petitioners on collateral review. Chaidez alleged
that her attorney failed to advise her whether her guilty plea could result in

87 Disagreement among reasonable jurists does not include, of course, situations such as
summary reversals where a lower court explicitly refuses to follow established precedent.
88 See infra subsection II.D.3.
89 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000).
90 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 n.11 (2013) (citations omitted).
91 Cf. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 n.5 (2004) (“Because the focus of the inquiry is
whether reasonable jurists could diﬀer as to whether precedent compels the sought-for rule, we do
not suggest that the mere existence of a dissent suﬃces to show that the rule is new.”).
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removal. 92 Padilla, by contrast, alleged that his lawyer had aﬃrmatively
misled him by telling him that his guilty plea would not make him eligible
for deportation.93 Padilla’s counsel advocated for the broad rule that the
Court ultimately adopted, but as a fallback position, also suggested that the
Court could rule simply that misadvice is a Sixth Amendment violation,
without establishing an aﬃrmative duty. 94 But because Chaidez was not
alleging misadvice, her counsel had no incentive to advocate for a mixed
rule on retroactivity. As yet another consequence of the Court’s taking
Chaidez as its vehicle on this issue, the parties did not raise the possibility of
the retroactivity of one part of the Padilla rule but not of the other.
As a result, it appears to be an open question whether, after Chaidez,
claims of misadvice are available on collateral review.95 This speculation
hinges in part on the fact that the government almost conceded that point
at oral argument. Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben stated, in
response to a question from Justice Sotomayor, “I would probably not
disagree that misadvice claim was not new before Padilla and it’s not really
addressed by Padilla’s rationale.”96 The Chaidez opinion itself furthered the
ambiguity of Mr. Dreeben’s “probably not.” The Court noted that the
Padilla decision had determined not to exempt “a lawyer’s advice (or nonadvice) about a plea’s deportation risk” from “Sixth Amendment scrutiny,”
and had applied the Strickland test when a lawyer “gives (or fails to give)
advice about immigration consequences.”97 Those statements could imply
that the rule the Court was considering encompassed both misadvice and
non-advice. But the Court went on to reject Chaidez’s argument that the
lower court cases prohibiting misadvice demonstrated that the Padilla rule
was not new. While three federal circuits and some state courts had held
misstatements to constitute ineﬀective assistance of counsel, the Court
described the rule established by those decisions as “only that a lawyer may
92
93
94

Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
Brief of Petitioner at i, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1497552. This, of
course, is the position that Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, ultimately took in
Padilla. See supra text accompanying note 38.
95 See, e.g., M ICHAEL K. M EHR , I MMIGRANT L EGAL R ES . C TR ., P OST -C ONVICTION
R ELIEF IN C ALIFORNIA S HOULD B E U NAFFECTED BY C HAIDEZ V. U NITED STATES 2 (2013),
available at http://www.ilrc.org/ﬁles/documents/ilrc-pcr_in_calif_not_aﬀected_by_chaidez_march_
2013.pdf (assuming that misadvice claims will be available retroactively for habeas petitioners);
Benach Ragland LLP, Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Chaidez, L IFTED L AMP (Feb. 22,
2013), http://liftedlamp.wordpress.com/2013/02/22/thoughts-on-the-supreme-courts-opinion-in-chaidez
(questioning the status of misadvice claims on collateral review).
96 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-820.pdf.
97 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110.
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not aﬃrmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead
his client on any important matter.”98 Those decisions, the Court said, “coexisted happily with precedent, from the same jurisdictions (and almost all
others), holding that deportation” did not warrant an exception to the
collateral consequences rule.99 And this “separate rule for material misrepresentations” did “not apply to Chaidez’s case” but had “lived in harmony
with the exclusion of claims like hers from the Sixth Amendment.”100
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s characterization of the signiﬁcance of lower court precedent on misadvice, but seemed to further the idea
that the majority was not ruling on the retroactivity of the misadvice rule.
The dissent characterized lower court rulings that permitted misadvice
claims as recognizing “an important exception to the collateral/direct
consequences distinction.”101 But, the dissent noted, the majority looked at
misadvice cases as having “merely applied the age-old principle that a
lawyer may not aﬃrmatively mislead a client.”102
Thus, much of the majority’s language and the dissent’s understanding
of the majority support the idea that what the Court held in Chaidez was
that the aﬃrmative duty to advise a client about removal consequences was
not retroactive. But the status of the rule preventing a lawyer from misadvising a client about removal consequences seems to remain in limbo.
3. (Not) Dealing with Habeas Policy and the
Practical Consequences of Retroactivity
Although none of the opinions spends much time contemplating policy
or practical consequences, it is worth considering how the outcome of
Chaidez ﬁts with the sometimes competing purposes and policies that
underlie habeas review. Particularly, it seems that many of these considerations support at least part of the majority’s decision, while presenting some
cautionary principles for the outcome the dissent would have adopted.
Habeas review must protect the role of the judiciary and the ﬁnality of its
decisions and respect federalism concerns over the relationship between
state and federal courts, while also ensuring accuracy, equality, and ﬁnality
in the administration of justice.103
98 Id. at 1112.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1119 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
103 For an overview of the various policy

note 16, at 891-95.

considerations at issue, see C HEMERINSKY, supra
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a. Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary
Overturning a lower court conviction, particularly on habeas review
many years after the criminal proceedings began, raises hard questions
about the role of the judiciary. Part of the debate over retroactivity hinges
on what it has to say about the role of judges in our judicial system. One
view, attributed to Blackstone, is that judges, rather than making law,
declare what the law is. 104 Under this logic, a judicial decision should
typically have retroactive eﬀect, because it simply declares what the law
always was.105 At the same time, “there is also recognition that unrestrained
application [of this principle] could create chaos in the judicial system,”106
which is why principles of restraint like the Teague rule limit the retroactivity
of claims on collateral review.
The Supreme Court has also expressed a desire to respect, rather than
overturn, the good faith decisions of lower courts made in reliance on
precedent.107 One of the concerns expressed in Teague was respect for the
“interests of comity and ﬁnality” of lower court decisions.108 The Supreme
Court has seemed sympathetic to the concerns of state court judges, noting
that state courts “are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply
existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover . . . new
constitutional commands.”109 Additionally, states and their courts are the
initial arbiters of much of criminal law; they “possess primary authority for
deﬁning and enforcing the criminal law. . . . Federal intrusions into state
criminal trials frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish oﬀenders
and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.” 110 As the
Court has expressed, limits on habeas “reﬂect our enduring respect for ‘the
State’s interest in the ﬁnality of convictions that have survived direct
review within the state court system.’”111
This respect suggests that state court convictions on federal habeas review, like Jose Padilla’s, should be treated carefully by lower federal courts,
and helps explain why the Supreme Court chose in Chaidez not to make
104 Steven W. Allen, Toward a Uniﬁed Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. S CH . L. R EV . 105,
107 (2010); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
105 Allen, supra note 104, at 108.
106 Id. at 109.
107 C HEMERINSKY , supra note 16, at 939-40.
108 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion). Allowing criminal law
decisions to remain ﬁnal also enhances the deterrent eﬀect of judges’ rulings. Id. at 309.
109 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33 (1982).
110 Id. at 128 (citation omitted).
111 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (citations omitted).
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retroactive a rule that would threaten state court convictions. But Chaidez
sought review of a federal conviction. Although the Court did not consider
the signiﬁcance of the federal nature of Chaidez’s conviction (because
Chaidez had waived this argument),112 the federalism rationale of Teague
cannot support a limit on federal review of federal convictions. Additionally,
AEDPA governs retroactivity when the state has ruled on the merits of a
claim on postconviction review, 113 so Teague now applies only when the
state has not reached the merits of the issue, making the desire to respect
state courts’ decisional reasoning somewhat less of a concern. But, had
Chaidez made Padilla retroactive, state courts would have been bound by the
decision, so state court convictions would have been unsettled even though
the conviction on review before the Court was federal. 114 Additionally,
Teague’s commitment to respecting the good faith interpretations of lower
courts remains salient whether the lower court is state or federal. Notably,
although Chaidez made Padilla nonretroactive, state courts are still free to
apply the rule retroactively;115 it is possible that Padilla could be retroactive
in some states even though it is not retroactive in the federal system.
Another relevant concern in deciding retroactivity is the extent to which
we need a federal court to police a rule by making it retroactive. The Warren
Court was concerned with the reluctance of some state courts to enforce
constitutional protections for all individuals; some have argued that the
Rehnquist Court then saw this as the driving purpose of federal habeas
review, considering that review to be less important where state reluctance
had diminished.116 This has interesting implications for the Padilla rule, which
is based on evolving professional norms—norms that could have changed
earlier in some jurisdictions than in others. Since some state courts already
had rules similar to Padilla, retroactive application may have been less
necessary; many state criminal defendants beneﬁtted from the protection of
some form of the Padilla rule anyway. Furthermore, as Justice Alito noted in
his concurrence in Padilla, the ﬂexible standard governing the withdrawal of

112
113
114

See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 n.16 (2013).
See supra note 13 (discussing AEDPA’s limits on retroactivity).
It remains an open question whether state courts are bound to apply retroactively “watershed”
rules that are retroactive under Teague. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 n.4 (2008).
115 See id. at 266 (holding that state courts may apply “new” rules of criminal procedure retroactively, even if federal courts may not).
116 See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. C AL . L. R EV . 2331, 2425 (1993) (characterizing the Rehnquist Court’s view of the purpose of habeas corpus as “deter[ring] the state
courts from ignoring fundamental federal rights”).
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guilty pleas could encompass pleas made on incomplete or incorrect information, so state judges could permit withdrawal regardless of Padilla.117
b. Equality and Accuracy Concerns in Retroactivity
Concerns the Teague Court stressed repeatedly, and that are always
implicated in determining the retroactivity of decisions, are the equal
administration of law and the accuracy of convictions resulting from that
administration.
The Warren Court’s three-factor balancing test for determining whether
a rule would be retroactive118 had the eﬀect of not always applying all rules
equally to all petitioners.119 Concern over the equal administration of justice
was one of the driving themes of the Teague opinion; the plurality stated
that “the harm caused by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants
alike cannot be exaggerated.”120 Padilla’s conviction was already ﬁnal when
the Supreme Court decided his case, but the rule in Padilla was nevertheless
applied to him. This means that now that the rule is not retroactive, he was
treated unequally compared to others whose convictions were also ﬁnal but
who cannot receive the beneﬁt of the rule—like Chaidez.
The Teague plurality also noted that “our cases have moved in the direction of reaﬃrming the relevance of the likely accuracy of convictions in
determining the available scope of habeas review.” 121 This consideration
explains the second exception to Teague—watershed rules that could go to
the innocence of a defendant or the accuracy of his conviction should apply
retroactively.122 Accuracy concerns also led the Court to continue to allow
claims of Miranda violations on habeas review, after foreclosing, in Stone v.
Powell, claims on habeas for Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule violations already litigated in state court.123 The Court stated that a defendant’s
inculpatory statements made without Miranda warnings would be less
117 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting other ways courts could have addressed the problems presented in the case).
118 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
119 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court’s
earlier approach to retroactivity resulted in “unequal treatment of those who were similarly
situated”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 H ARV. L. R EV. 1731, 1744-45 (1991) (characterizing the Court’s
decision in Griﬃth v. Kentucky, ��� U.S. ��� (����), as based in part on the desire to undo the
inequality of earlier approaches to retroactivity).
120 Teague, 489 U.S. at 315.
121 Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
122 Id. at 311, 313.
123 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (declining to extend the rule in
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to habeas claims premised on Miranda violations).
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reliable as evidence on which to base the determination of guilt or innocence at trial.124 Thus, the Miranda rule could bear on the “correct ascertainment of guilt.” 125 The accuracy of a conviction is of less concern in
Padilla claims, however. Miranda claims at least go to statements that will
be used in the determination of guilt; Padilla claims, however, go simply to
a defendant’s decision to plead guilty. What drives this decision may be
strategy or a concern about consequences, but it does not assist in determining whether the defendant actually committed the crime.
c. Lack of Finality
Retroactivity disturbs ﬁnal convictions, frustrating both the victims of
crime and the public—a problem that Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting
opinion does not acknowledge. Although Padilla himself was convicted of
drug traﬃcking, a “victimless” crime, and Chaidez was convicted of fraud
on an insurance company, perhaps an unsympathetic victim, others who
would have raised Padilla claims on habeas may have left behind victims.
Those who challenge their sentences on habeas typically do so years after
the original crimes took place. The Court has noted, “Only with an assurance of real ﬁnality can the State execute its moral judgment in a case. Only
with real ﬁnality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral
judgment will be carried out.”126 Postconviction review also places heavy
ﬁnancial costs on courts, often requiring years of litigation.127 The Chaidez
dissent could have refuted this ﬁnality criticism by noting that petitioners
under Strickland must show that the ineﬀective assistance of counsel prejudiced the defense.128 Showing prejudice has typically been very diﬃcult for
petitioners,129 making it unlikely that even retroactive application of Padilla
would have freed large numbers of convicted criminals. But it still would
have involved the time and expense of additional litigation.

124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 692 (citations omitted).
Id.
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998).
See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (citation omitted).
See Strickland v. Washington, ��� U.S. ���, ��� (����) (“[A]ny deﬁciencies in counsel’s
performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineﬀective assistance under
the Constitution.”).
129 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 n.12 (2010).
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND O PEN Q UESTIONS
The Chaidez decision leaves open several questions about what claims
might still be available to alien criminal defendants. As noted above, the
Court in Chaidez was ambiguous as to whether its rule covers misadvice,
raising the question whether those whose convictions are ﬁnal might still
raise misadvice claims. The decision also sharpens the debate over where
the Court has been coming from—and where it is headed—in plea bargaining and “crimmigration” law. Finally, the decision avoids dealing with the
question of how a standard built on norms that can change (i.e., Strickland)
can apply retroactively; in the future, the Court should grapple with this issue.
A. What About Misadvice?
The Chaidez decision seems to leave open whether claims of misadvice
regarding removal consequences are available to petitioners whose convictions were ﬁnal before Padilla. 130 While we know the duty to provide
aﬃrmative removal advice is not retroactive, arguments could remain open
to alien petitioners who seek relief in federal court from a plea they accepted after their attorney told them it would not subject them to removal. And
of course, these same arguments could be raised in state court, along with
the argument that state courts need not follow the Supreme Court’s lead on
Padilla’s nonretroactivity.131
Under the Chaidez majority’s heavy reliance on the views of reasonable
jurists, retroactivity of the misadvice prohibition is less problematic than
retroactivity of the aﬃrmative duty. Chaidez’s attorneys faced an uphill
battle in convincing a majority of the Court that the aﬃrmative duty was
not a new rule; after all, four of the Justices—those who concurred in or
dissented from Padilla—had not even thought the rule was correct, let alone
not novel.132 On retroactivity then, presumably Chaidez started four votes
down. But on the issue of misadvice, seven Justices were in agreement: the
concurring Justices in Padilla agreed that Strickland prevented it, and
asserted that such a ruling would “not require any upheaval in the law.”133
As Justice Alito observed, no lower courts, other than the Kentucky Supreme
Court, had held that aﬃrmative misadvice could “never give rise to ineﬀective
130
131
132

See supra subsection II.D.2.
See supra text accompanying note 115.
Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 96, at 15 (“Justice Scalia: ‘But you, on the
other hand, would agree, would you not, that those who dissented from [Padilla] would regard it as
a new rule?’ Mr. Fisher: ‘That’s a tricky question to answer, Justice Scalia.’ Justice Scalia: ‘Well, I
think it’s an easy question to answer.’”).
133 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1493 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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assistance,”134 so his approach prohibiting misadvice would not have contravened the lower courts to the same extent that the majority opinion did.
Forcing one outlier state to follow retroactively the rule against misadvice
seems much less threatening to Teague’s values of federalism and respect for
lower courts.135 Just as Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben had conceded that
the rule against misadvice was “probably not” new and “not really addressed
by Padilla’s rationale,”136 so also the Chaidez majority called it “a separate
rule for material misrepresentations,”137 while the dissent referred to it as “the
age-old principle that a lawyer may not aﬃrmatively mislead a client.”138
Additionally, concerns about what conduct can fairly be expected from
defense attorneys are less of an issue for the retroactivity of the rule against
misadvice. It seems particularly unfair to scrutinize retroactively the
conduct of defense lawyers who had little warning—depending on the
strength of the professional norms around them—that their role included an
aﬃrmative duty to provide correct information on removal consequences.
But it is not a stretch to assume that defense attorneys would not feel free
to give patently wrong advice to a client—even on a topic beyond the scope
of their representation. It seems far less reasonable to expect defense
attorneys to have always appreciated the eventual Padilla rule, with its duty
to advise clients on clear removal consequences. Defense lawyers in some
states, in fact, already had been told that they did not need to worry about
providing such advice. But no state (until Kentucky in the Padilla case) had
ever declared that misadvice had no constitutional implications. And it seems
most unfair to deny relief to those individuals who received patently wrong
information that was integral to their ultimate decision to plead guilty.
Further, since many states, and presumably individual defense counsel,
already recognized this rule concerning misadvice, retroactivity would likely
result in relatively few habeas petitions. This cuts against the prohibition on
misadvice being a new rule, as it was a preexisting duty in many states. It
also addresses some equality issues. Since Padilla received both misadvice
and the beneﬁt of the rule in his case, so too would others who were
similarly situated. Additionally, assuming that many defense lawyers had
been operating under the prevailing norm against misadvice, retroactive
134
135

Id. at 1494.
See id.; see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1118 & n.6 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the agreement among lower courts regarding the treatment of aﬃrmative
misstatements).
136 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 96, at 32.
137 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112 (majority opinion).
138 Id. at 1119 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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application would provide relief to the few defendants who did not receive
such a lawyer. Finally, while the decision to take a plea seems to imply a
defendant’s guilt, the presence of misadvice makes this conclusion less
certain. A defendant who had been positively informed that the decision to
plead guilty would not result in deportation might decide to plead guilty—
even, presumably, if she were innocent—in order to avoid the risk of going
to trial on a more serious charge that might result in deportation. But a
defendant who was not advised one way or the other would seem less likely
to have made such an explicit decision. In this way, misadvice could actually
bear on whether the administration of law leads to accurate convictions.
B. A New Direction After All?
The Chaidez Court’s decision that the Padilla rule was “new” adds an
interesting dimension to the debate over what the Court has been doing in
its recent plea bargaining jurisprudence. Over the past few years, the Court
has expanded the claims available, often on habeas, to petitioners who allege
ﬂaws in the way their pleas came about.
Strickland’s reasonableness requirement has long been viewed as a weak
one; 139 tales abound of shocking defense attorney conduct that has been
upheld under Strickland.140 The Court may be expanding Strickland’s reach,
however; alongside Padilla, it has recently issued other decisions that
strengthen the demands of Strickland,141 among them the duty to investigate
potential mitigating factors in capital cases. 142 More recently, the Court
held in Missouri v. Frye that, “as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty
to communicate formal oﬀers from the prosecution to accept a plea on
terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused,” and that failure
to communicate oﬀers constitutes ineﬀective assistance under Strickland.143
In Laﬂer v. Cooper, a case decided the same day as Frye, the Court extended
139 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 C ALIF. L. R EV. 1117, 1145 (2011) (noting that Strickland had long been
viewed as “toothless”).
140 See M ARC L. M ILLER & R ONALD F. W RIGHT , C RIMINAL P ROCEDURES : C ASES ,
S TATUTES, AND E XECUTIVE M ATERIALS 809 (4th ed. 2011) (describing defense attorneys who
have been accused of ineﬀective assistance under Strickland for “sleeping, being drunk or drugged,
or otherwise being physically unable to present an eﬀective defense”).
141 See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding a lawyer’s failure to consult
with his client about ﬁling an appeal when a rational defendant would want to appeal to be
ineﬀective assistance of counsel).
142 See Bibas, supra note 139, at 1145 & n.145 (noting the Court’s recent case law on the duty
to investigate in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003);
and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)).
143 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).

12 Susanj Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

76

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

5/16/2014 2:16 PM

[Vol. 162: 55

Frye’s application of Strickland for plea oﬀers to a case where a lawyer gave
erroneous advice about a plea, resulting in the defendant’s rejection of the
plea.144 That defendant’s case was on postconviction review, signaling that
the rules are retroactive and thus, presumably, not new.145 Both cases relied
on “the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of
pleas, not a system of trials.”146 Indeed, as the Court noted in Frye, about
ninety-ﬁve percent of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas, making
plea bargains “central to the administration of the criminal justice system.”147
Perhaps the Court is telling us that we have been misunderstanding
what Strickland really required all along.148 Professor Josh Bowers views the
Court’s approach to guilty pleas in Padilla as similar to its past approach:
“the fairness principles that animate the Court’s decision in Padilla are the
same principles that have animated its guilty-plea and plea-bargaining jurisprudence all along.”149 He views Padilla as a “potentially substantial step down
a well-worn path,” “an unfamiliar result reached through familiar means.”150
But others see Padilla as a remarkable change of direction in the Court’s
plea jurisprudence. Professor Stephanos Bibas has described Padilla as a
“tremor” resulting in “large shifts in landscape”—“the dawn of a new era” in
the Court’s regulation of plea bargaining.151 Justice Alito’s description of the
decision suggests that he views it similarly, calling it a “dramatic departure
from precedent,” a “new approach,” and a “major upheaval in Sixth
Amendment law.”152 The Court has continued to look to Padilla in cases
that have expanded the protections available to those who plead guilty,
relying on the Padilla rule to bolster its analysis in both Laﬂer and Frye.153
And Chaidez’s labeling of Padilla as “new” seems to validate these views.
The Court described the Padilla decision as having “breach[ed] the previously
144
145

132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390-91 (2012).
Id. at 1390; see also In re Graham, 714 F.3d 1181, 1182 (10th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases that
conclude that Laﬂer did not establish a new rule of constitutional law).
146 Id. at 1388; see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
147 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citations omitted).
148 The Court has not told us whether other recent ineﬀective assistance cases apply retroactively. See, e.g., Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646, 654 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that whether Roe
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), “constitutes an ‘old’ rule for retroactivity purposes is a
question of ﬁrst impression”).
149 Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Response to
Professor Bibas, 2 C ALIF. L. R EV. C IRCUIT 52, 54 (2011).
150 Id.
151 Bibas, supra note 139, at 1137-39.
152 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
153 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405-�� (����); Laﬂer v. Cooper, ��� S. Ct. ����,
1384 (2012).
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chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences.”154 If that did
not count as “break[ing] new ground,” the Court continued, “we are hard
pressed to know what would.”155 These various descriptions, and the simple
designation of Padilla as “new,” seem to conﬁrm that Padilla changed the
world of plea bargaining law in a way that was diﬀerent from the Court’s
previous cases.
Padilla’s newness validates the concerns Justice Alito expressed in his
concurrence in that case. Had Padilla been a simple application of Strickland, it is possible that it would not have led to arguments for expanding its
rationale even further, to other collateral consequences. Many collateral
consequences besides removal may follow a criminal conviction; now that
the Court has broken new ground by ﬁnding that one technically “collateral” consequence falls within the scope of Strickland, future litigants will
argue that this new rule should be extended to those other consequences. As
Justice Alito put it,
This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing,
including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote,
disqualiﬁcation from public beneﬁts, ineligibility to possess ﬁrearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses.156

Padilla and the Court’s other recent plea bargaining cases may dramatically shape the landscape of habeas litigation going forward, even though
Chaidez has told us Padilla cannot do so retroactively. Typically, defendants
entering guilty pleas waive their rights to appeal most issues, 157 so most
habeas petitioners are defendants who went to trial.158 Thus, for those who
plead guilty, ineﬀective assistance may be the one claim that remains
available.159 When Strickland claims were practically impossible to win, this

154
155
156
157

Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013).
Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
Bibas, supra note 139, at 1123; see also M ARC L. M ILLER & R ONALD F. W RIGHT, C RIMINAL P ROCEDURES : C ASES , S TATUTES , AND E XECUTIVE M ATERIALS 1592-93 (3d ed. 2007)
(noting limits on the claims available to habeas petitioners who have pleaded guilty).
158 Habeas petitioners are much more likely to have been convicted at trial than to have
pleaded guilty, and to have been convicted of more serious oﬀenses with longer sentences. See MILLER
& WRIGHT, supra note 157, at 1592. One study found that while the jury trial rate for felonies in urban
areas was 6%, 62% of state court petitioners and 66% of federal petitioners had gone to trial. Id.
159 The same study found that between 41% and 45% of all habeas petitioners (both those
who went to trial and those who pleaded guilty) raised the claim of ineﬀective assistance of
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meant that few claims by defendants who pleaded guilty were likely to be
successful. But as the Court expands the scope of plea bargaining issues
cognizable under Strickland, the potential for litigation likewise expands.
Because defendants who plead guilty so signiﬁcantly outnumber those who
go to trial, the number of defendants getting access to more claims may be
growing exponentially.
C. The Future of Strickland and Teague
The Court, by ﬁnding Padilla to be new, avoided a diﬃcult issue, one it
should confront if it ever decides a Strickland-based rule is retroactive.
Strickland deﬁnes reasonableness in part by prevailing professional norms,
norms that evolve and change over time. As the Court in Padilla stated, the
professional norms instructing defense attorneys to provide removal advice
had existed for “at least the past 15 years.”160 The Padilla Court’s identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc point in time at which norms changed highlights the
challenge of Strickland and retroactivity: if norms changed ﬁfteen years ago,
that would imply that at some point they were new, because at some point
before norms develop, they do not exist. Assume that Chaidez had adopted
the dissent’s approach and applied Padilla retroactively. According to the
Court, the norms were clearly not new fourteen years ago, but were they new
sixteen years ago? And if Teague only allows retroactive application of rules
that are not new, what does this mean for applying a rule based on prevailing
norms to the time period (sixteen years ago, in the Padilla hypothetical) when
those norms did not yet exist—and so were new?161 Would a habeas petitioner
whose case became ﬁnal ﬁfteen years and one month before the Padilla
decision be unable to take advantage of the rule, since the norms did not exist
when his case became ﬁnal (and so to him the rule is new)?162
Certainly, trying to draw the line between what is new and what is not
in the context of a constitutional standard that relies on changing norms is
challenging. The Court avoided this problem in Chaidez because Padilla was
new, but it is not impossible to imagine other Teague cases in which a
counsel. Id. at 1593. When a defense attorney had failed to explain a plea agreement and its
consequences adequately, petitioners often claimed they were misled into making the plea. Id.
160 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (majority opinion).
161 Cf. id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although we may appropriately
consult standards promulgated by private bar groups, we cannot delegate to these groups our task
of determining what the Constitution commands.” (citation omitted)).
162 It is not impossible (although it is diﬃcult) for habeas petitioners to raise claims related
to convictions that are as many as twenty years old. See, e.g., Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794, 796
(2005) (considering a habeas claim from a defendant convicted of a crime committed in 1985).
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petitioner has prevailed by arguing that a norm had developed that made
her defense counsel’s conduct a violation of Strickland. Indeed, Justice
Sotomayor argued as much in Chaidez, noting that the only change Padilla
prompted in the law was that “the underlying professional norms” meant
“that counsel’s failure to give this advice now amounted to constitutionally
deﬁcient performance.”163 Again, because Strickland is premised on norms,
which change and evolve, this problem is not unique to Padilla; it could
come up any time the Court recognizes a norm that makes defense counsel’s
behavior ineﬀective under Strickland.164
One solution would be for courts to grant a habeas petitioner the beneﬁt
of retroactive Strickland-based rules only if the petitioner can show that the
rule was not new at the time the alleged violation took place. But that
would require courts to determine, potentially, on which month norms
ﬂipped—and would that not vary by geographic location? It certainly seems
likely that the Padilla norms would have developed in border states or urban
areas like New York before they developed in rural South Dakota. There
will not always be a statute or case to pinpoint the exact date, so it becomes
impossible to know what the judge should or would look to in making his
decision. Not only would this require a diﬃcult factual ﬁnding by judges,
but it also would ask them to make a tricky legal determination, balancing a
Strickland standard based on local customs and norms with Teague’s emphasis on uniformity in the treatment of criminal defendants. Any time a
Strickland rule is premised on issues that might be more salient in some
parts of the country than in others, retroactivity could vary. But equality is
central, according to Teague, to deciding whether a rule is new. Given the
reliance on changing norms, the implication for making Strickland rules
retroactive is that similarly situated litigants—habeas petitioners—may be
treated diﬀerently depending on whether they were convicted in a part of
the country that developed the relevant norms earlier or later.
It seems arbitrary to enforce retroactively any rule that is the product of
changing norms, since at some point those norms must have been new—but
by deﬁnition, Strickland rules will often be the products of changing norms,
and the Court has never suggested that this would prevent their retroactivity.
Certainly the Court in Chaidez did not imply that future Strickland cases
163
164

Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1116 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
In fact, the puzzle of how to identify an evolving constitutional norm comes up in other
areas as well. In the oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry, Justice Scalia pressed respondents’
counsel Ted Olson to provide a date on which it became unconstitutional to prohibit gay marriage,
and Mr. Olson stated that he could provide no speciﬁc date, because it was “an evolutionary
cycle.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12144), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144.pdf.
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that rely on developing norms can never be retroactive. But the inherent
messiness of this determination suggests that not just Padilla, but perhaps
any Strickland rule that relies on changing norms, is simply too complicated
to be made retroactive.
These questions implicate a more fundamental conﬂict, between the nature of habeas review and the Strickland rule. How do we balance habeas—
seen as the last safety valve to protect fundamental rights, rather than the
point at which to litigate garden-variety claims—with Strickland standards
that evolve over time, typically through incremental litigation? The issue
comes down to what we think we are doing when we permit habeas litigation. Courts often speak of habeas as a ﬁnal backstop to protect essential
rights and freedoms, to ensure that the innocent are set free 165 —not to
permit endless litigation over mistakes not implicating those fundamental
issues. But postconviction review often will be the ﬁrst time defendants can
raise Strickland ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims.166 Thus, Strickland
roots the development of ineﬀective assistance claims on the evolution of
norms—norms that must evolve through litigation on habeas. But because
habeas has traditionally been about the enforcement of clearly established
rights, not the development of new norms and claims, it is hard to see how
the purposes of both Strickland and habeas can be served simultaneously in
postconviction litigation.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s opinion in Chaidez made the question of Padilla’s retroactive application seem quite simple, with its argument that the fact that
Strickland could even apply to claims like Jose Padilla’s and Roselva
Chaidez’s represented a new direction for the Court. But the decision left
open whether other claims—claims that attorneys actively misled defendants—might still be available retroactively. As the Court continues to grant
more expansive protection to criminal defendants who plead guilty, diﬃcult
questions will also arise regarding how to deal with retroactivity under a
standard that relies on norms that evolve over time. Just as the Court
changed its approach to retroactivity in Teague, reacting to the Warren
165 See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685-87 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
166 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30 (claiming that Padilla-type claims “must be
litigated in . . . initial-review collateral proceedings” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508-09 (2003) (permitting federal
petitioners to raise ineﬀective assistance claims for the ﬁrst time on collateral review).
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Court’s increasing protections for criminal defendants, so too must the
Roberts Court reevaluate how it will deal with retroactivity in Strickland cases,
against the backdrop of changing protections for defendants who plead guilty.
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